Introduction
Negotiation systems with self-interested agents are becoming increasingly important, e.g. due to the technology push of a growing standardized communication infrastructure, and the application pull from electronic commerce and virtual enterprises. Multiagent technology facilitates such negotiation at the operative decision making level. This automation can save labor time of human negotiators, but in addition, other savings are possible because computational agents can be more effective at finding beneficial short-term contracts than humans are in strategically and combinatorially complex settings.
*Supported by NSF CAREER award IRI-9703122 and NSF grant IRI-9610122. In multiagent systems for electronic commerce, agents usually have different goals, and each agent is trying to maximize its own good without concern for the global good. In building computer support for negotiation in such settings, the issue of self-interest has to be dealt with. This paper overviews six component technologies which we have developed for battling the selfinterest and combinatorial complexity simultaneously.
OCSM-contracts in marginal cost based contracting
In this technology, the agents reallocate items (e.g. tasks, securities, or resources) among themselves based on a distributed contracting protocol. The agents base their bidding and awarding decisions solely on their actual marginal costs for the items. The contracting scheme is an anytime algorithm; it maintains a feasible solution throughout the negotiation process and guarantees that each agent's utility improves monotonically.
A key observation was to view contracting as hillclimbing in the space of allocations, and to analyze it using a graph formalism. It turns out that-due to interdependencies in the valuations of the itemsoraganal (0) contracts of one item at a time do not allow a globally optimal allocation to be reached. To solve this problem, we introduced new contract types:
cluster (C) contracts (Sandholm 1993; 1991) where a set of tasks is atomically contracted from one agent to another, swap (S) contracts where a pair of agents swaps a pair of tasks, and multaagent (M) contracts where more than two agents are involved in an atomic exchange of tasks (Sandholm 1998; Sandholm & Lesser 1995) . Each of the four contract types avoids some of the local optima that the other three do not. Finally, we devised a composite contract type, OCSM-contract. which is necessary and sufficient for reaching a globally optimal allocation in a finite number of contracts without backtracking. For small problem instances this is an important result, but for large ones the anytime feature of the algorithm is more important since an optimal allocation can take impractically long to reach. 0-8186-8500-W98 $10.00 0 1998 IEEE
Leveled commitment contracts
We constructed a leveled commitment contracting protocol that allows self-interested agents to efficiently accommodate future events by having the possibility of unilaterally decommit ting from a contract based on local reasoning. A decoinmitment penalty is assigned to both agents in a contract: to be freed from the contract, an agent only pays this penalty to the other party. It was shown through formal analysis of several contracting settings that this leveled commitment feature in a contracting protocol increases Pareto efficiency of deals and can make contracts individually rational when no full commitment contract can. The analysis was nontrivial because self-interested agents decoinmit manipulatively: a Nash equilibrium analysis of the decommitting game was necessary (Sandholm & Lesser 1996; . Finally, we experimented with leveled commitment when agents make sequences of contracts (Andersson & Sandholm 1998a; 1998b ).
Anytime coal.ition structure generation with worst case guarantees
One would prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. But, then, can the coalition structure found via a partial search be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum? We show that none of the previous coalition structure generation algorithms can establish any bound because they search fewer nodes than a threshold that we show necessary for establishing a bound. We present an algorithm that establishes a tight bound within this minimal amount of search, and show ,that any other algorithm would have to search strictly more. The fraction of nodes needed to be searched approaches zero as the number of agents grows. If additional time remains, our anytime algorithm searches further, and establishes a progressively lower tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more node drops the bound in half. As desired, our algorithm lowers the bound rapidly early on, and exhibits diminishing returns to computation. It also drastically outperforms its obvious contenders (Sandholm et al. 1998).
Trading off computation cost against optimization quality within each coalition
Under costless compul;ation, each coalition would solve its optimization problem, which would define the value of that Coalition. Hoswever, in practice, in many domains it is too complex from a combinatorial viewpoint to solve the problem exactly. In such settings, self-interested agents would want to strike the optimal tradeoff between solution quality and the cost of the associated computaticm We have studied performance profile based deliberation control in such settings. The computational characteristics significantly affect which coalition structure is optimal, and whether it is stable (Sandholm & Lesser 1997 ).
Distributing search among insincere agents
In this work we show how any given search algorithm can be distributed among agents in a way that motivates the self-interested agents to abide to the algorithm (Sandholm et al. 1998 ).
Unenforced contract execution
Sometimes exchanges can be carried out safely without. enforcement by splitting the exchange into chunks that the agents then alternately deliver to each other. Our chunking algorithms and chunk sequencing algorithm guarantee that a safe exchange is identified whenever that is possible (Sandholm 1997) .
